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Grift: There's also a potential grifty explanation for what's going on here. Two of them, actually. If Trump really does manage to turn over some portion of Venezuela's (nationalized) oil supply to American firms, surely they would be expected to pay generously for the favor. His super PAC currently has $300 million in the bank, which is a record. Further donations to the PAC would be one way to "thank" the President. Buying large amounts of Trump cryptocurrency would be another.

Or, in a considerably more specific, and considerably less speculative, possibility, there is a holding company called Blue Water Acquisition Corporation (BWAC). Recently, it tried (and failed) to acquire the U.S. assets of Citgo Petroleum, which is majority-owned by Venezuelan interests. Even more recently, Devin Nunes and other high-ranking officers of the Trump Media and Technology group assumed leadership of BWAC. There is no direct evidence, as yet, of anything untoward. But you do have a bunch of people who are deeply entwined with Trump's business interests, and who are now also deeply entwined with a company that is trying to do business with a Venezuelan oil company. All of this is certainly enough to make us a bit... queasy.

And as long as we're at it, let's mention a smaller-scale (possible) grift. On Friday, someone created what looks to be a brand-new account on the futures market Polymarket, and bet $30,000 that Maduro would be driven from power. A few hours later, Maduro WAS driven from power, and that bettor collected a tidy $436,759.61 profit for 3 minutes of work, and about 6 hours of keeping their $30,000 tied up. It sure has the appearance of someone who had inside information. We doubt it was Trump, because he usually doesn't operate at the six-figure level, preferring that his grifts start at a minimum of seven figures. On the other hand, he loves money so much he's hawking Bibles, crappy guitars and collectible coins, so... maybe.

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Revenge: There's also a revenge possibility. Actually, once again, there's two of them. Trump has hated Maduro in particular, and Venezuela in general, for a long time. The Donald does not like the fact that Maduro has thumbed his nose at Trump numerous times (see above, about the "come and get me" video, for example). Further, as part of the 2020 election conspiracy theorizing, Trump blames Venezuela for corrupting (some?) American voting machines. Oh, and Maduro and nearly all of the other people in Venezuela are brown (and a lot of them have tried to immigrate to the U.S.). So, there's a bee or two in Trump's bonnet here.

The other possibility is ridiculous enough that we wouldn't even bother to suggest it... if it wasn't Trump. He is really, really, really unhappy that he did not win the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize, which was announced on October 10. Instead, it went to a Venezuelan"Maduro opponent Mara Corina Machado. One cannot help but notice that the attacks on the fishing boats began around that time, and also that Trump made a point of insulting Machado for being "weak" yesterday. And he has such a need for validation that, you know, maybe he might vent his rage in this way. The one thing we're sure about is that 2026 Nobel Peace Prize is even further out of reach after this weekend.

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Wagging the Dog: We've now written this at least a hundred times, but there are certainly some current issues where Trump would like a distraction, with Jeffrey Epstein, inflation and bad news about insurance prices probably occupying the top three spots on the list. A war against Venezuela could be an attempt to create that distraction (though, if so, we doubt it will work).

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War Powers: Similarly, a "war," even if it's not declared, or even authorized by Congress, would theoretically unlock powers that Trump has been trying to use, primarily to eject immigrants that the administration wants to eject from the United States. More conspiratorial folks take it further, and say that what he really wants to do is create a justification for suspending the 2026 elections. These arguments are not likely to fly, but what matters isn't whether they will work, but whether Trump THINKS they will work.

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Rubio: Finally, it's not a secret that Trump can be manipulated by members of his staff into doing things that they want done. OMB Director Russell Vought has had an undue influence on fiscal policy (and the creation of DOGE, in particular); Senior Adviser Stephen Miller has had an undue influence on immigration policy. It's at least possible that one of the drivers of "Trump's" Venezuela policy is actually one of his underlings. And, if so, the obvious candidate is Marco Rubio. He's been wanting to impose American authority on Latin America in general, and Cuba in particular (see below), for a long time. Now, he might be pulling strings to achieve his goals.

fin

#8 Well, since you asked so nicely, onepigironsmoothbrainaut.

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Geopolitics

Given the flopping around we've seen in the last 36 hours, we really don't know if the Trump administration appreciates quite how much it's bitten off here. As we note above, Trump apparently has very big plans for Venezuela's oil reserves. He also said yesterday that the U.S. will "run" Venezuela until such time that it can hand off the reins to a new government. Readers may recall how long such "short-term" commitments lasted in places like The Philippines (48 years), Iraq (8) and Afghanistan (20).

And if a potential quagmire in Venezuela is not enough, there are some indications that this weekend's invasion is just the first step in a much bigger geopolitical plan. It's long been the case that Trump thinks the U.S. should control the Americas, Russia should control Europe and China should control Asia. We're not sure who is supposed to get Africa and Australia, but in any event, seizing Venezuela could be a big step toward trying to formalize these spheres of influence. There's even whispering on the Internet that Trump and Vladimir Putin have a handshake deal that the U.S. "gets" Venezuela's oil and Russia "gets" Iran's oil.

This would be consistent with a revival of what Trump is, again, trying to christen the "Don-roe" doctrine. But that framing, in addition to implying that America will no longer concern itself with European affairs, also implies that the U.S. will once again start mucking around in Latin America. And indeed, in addition to Rubio's thinly veiled threats against the current leadership of Cuba, Trump himself hinted yesterday that Mexico and/or Colombia might be next.

Trump is a world-class ignoramus when it comes to history, so he undoubtedly doesn't know anything about the Monroe Doctrine. When James Monroe first announced the new policy, its primary purpose was American security. He (and the actual author of the policy, then-Secretary of State John Quincy Adams) did not particularly care about America's right to interfere in Latin American affairs. What they cared about was the powers of Europe staying the heck out of the Western Hemisphere, since such involvement was a threat to the U.S. For about a century, the U.S. wasn't actually able to enforce the policy, but the U.K. and France basically honored it anyhow, as stability in Latin America also served their goals.

#8 Well, since you asked so nicely, onepigironsmoothbrainaut.

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Domestic Politics

It's remarkable that we haven't made this point, at least in this way, so far, but here it finally is: Maduro is a bad guy, who does lots of unpleasant things, and who kept power in a manner that is almost certainly fraudulent. At the same time, this weekend's invasion was legally dubious, and may be the start of a new chapter in American imperialism and nation-building. Those chapters usually have unhappy endings.

These things being the case, opinion on the invasion does not break down cleanly along partisan (or other ideological) lines. Some people think it was unquestionably worth it to get rid of Maduro. Others say the ends cannot justify the means. Many are between those two extremes. For example, among current Democratic members of Congress, Rep. Debbie Wasserman-Schulz (FL) was generally supportive of the attack, while Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer (NY) condemned it. Among Republican apostates, Adam Kinzinger is a thumbs up, but Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-GA) is a thumbs down. On the newspaper front, The New York Times' editorial board slammed the invasion as "illegal and unwise," while The Washington Post's (new-look) board called it "a major victory for American interests." Among the nations of the world, most leaders were critical of the Trump administration, including the leaders of Russia. On the other hand, French President Emmanuel Macron was laudatory, and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz was fairly positive, as well.

The point here is that it's a little hard to predict exactly how this will play out, politically. That said, we do have a few suspicions. The first is that we very seriously doubt there will be a "rally 'round the flag" effect. Consider the three most famous examples of that effect from the last century"Pearl Harbor, the Persian Gulf War and 9/11. In two of those cases, the U.S. was directly attacked (on its own soil), and in the third, the U.S. and a coalition of nations was riding to the rescue of a small, defenseless nation (Kuwait). That kind of positive momentum/moral certainty does not exist here. Oh, and even when there IS a rally 'round the flag effect, the effect usually dissipates. See the presidential election of 1992, or the midterm elections of 1942.

Second, it is already clear that this is no Pearl Harbor or invasion of Kuwait or 9/11; being critical of the government's military actions in Venezuela is not instant political suicide. You can tell, because the Senate is moving forward with an already-planned vote to strip Trump's authority to make war in... Venezuela. Can you imagine Congress, in December 1941, saying "Sorry. Gotta leave the Japanese alone!" or in September 2001 declaring "You know, we just can't be blaming Afghanistan for our problems?"

Third, and finally, the American people hate, hate, hate quagmires. And since Korea, and Vietnam (in particular), and the Iraq War and Afghanistan, they are particularly mindful of, and on the watch for, them. So, if this Venezuela situation turns into a mess, or if it turns into a mess and leads to additional messes in, say, Cuba and Colombia, it will not go well for the administration, we would imagine.

What it amounts to is that we can see a lot of ways that this thing goes south for the White House, to the detriment of the President and his party. It is very hard, given what we know right now, to see how it works out well, or somehow serves to improve the GOP's chances in 2026.

There you have it. And how was your New Year's? (Z, V, and A)

#8 Apparently, many people have that exact attitude about you, onepigironsmoothbrainaut

oneironaut, 24 plonks